German Air Force Airlift Operations by Generalmajor a. D. Fritz Morzik

Author:Generalmajor a. D. Fritz Morzik [Morzik, Generalmajor a. D. Fritz]
Language: eng
Format: azw3
Publisher: Valmy Publishing
Published: 2017-06-28T04:00:00+00:00

Section III: The Kuban Bridgehead, 4 February 1943-13 February 1943{156}

A. General

The large-scale Russian offensive of November 1942, which resulted in the encirclement of Stalingrad and the loss of the German Sixth Army, gained new impetus after the fall of Stalingrad freed additional Russian troops. Strong enemy forces began a thrust towards the west and south-west. The Russians obviously intended to exploit their winter successes by carrying the offensive on into the Donets Basin. The German defenders, already seriously weakened, were unable to turn back the attack and were forced to abandon their position at Rostov. And, the loss of this position meant a break in the front line which had linked the Donets Basin with the troops fighting in the Kuban sector of the Caucasus. At the same time, the landing of a strong Russian assault force at Novorossisk cut off the Kuban area from the other approach route, via the Crimea and the Strait of Kerch. Thus, with the Sea of Azov at its back, the Kuban Bridgehead{157} had become another encircled area, completely cut off from all source of supply and fighting on three sides to defend itself against strong Russian attacks.

The troops at Kuban had sufficient supplies on hand to last for the immediate future, but it was desirable that they be provided with adequate reserves to maintain their fighting power and their mobility so that they could fight their way back to their own lines, either by way of Rostov or via the Crimea and the Strait of Kerch. It was not yet possible to tell how soon forces could be freed from other sectors to re-establish contact with the bridgehead through a series of local attacks. Under the circumstances, supply by sea transport—which would have required armed support—was out of the question. Here again, air transport seemed to be the only possible means of furnishing the bridgehead with the needed supplies of ammunition, fuel, and food.

A systematic supply operation of the airlift type was beyond the realm of possibility at this time. The recently concluded Stalingrad airlift had exhausted the capabilities of almost all the air transport units in the East and its high consumption of personnel and matériel had reduced the resources of these units to a bare minimum. In addition, there was no adequately equipped take-off area and the distances involved were prohibitive. Since practically none of the prerequisites was met, there could be no thought of a systematically-planned airlift operation. After careful weighing of the requirements and the prospects for their successful fulfillment, the only type of operation possible was the utilization of the rest of the air transport units (including freight-glider units) and the 200th Bomber Group in individual air-supply missions.

Although the requirements were unlimited, no specific delivery goal could be guaranteed. The promise was made, however, that all operable transport aircraft would be pressed into service. The fact that air transport represented the only supply channel open to the bridgehead was accepted, but it was made clear to Army commanders in that area that they could not count on a full-scale airlift.

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